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IMPERIAL-YUMA PROtrel'Im 
CREDIT ASSOCIATI~, a 
corporaticn, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respcndent, 
EARL HUNTER and 
IAV~ HUNTER, his wife, 
vs. 
Defendants and 
Third Party 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
GIS LIVES'IOCK MANAGEMENT, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
and GFDRGE L. SMITH, 
Third Party 
Defendants. 
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OF '1HE STATE OF t1l'AR 
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Ci vi.l No. 233316 
REPLY BRIEF OF AI'I'EI.MNl' 
STATIMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by llq:lerial-Yuma against Earl and LaVon 
Hunter to recover an arrount , alleged to be owlilg an account tnder a 
level line of credit arrangement evidenced by a promissory note, to-
gether with attorney's fees. Involved is the accuracy of an accounting 
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prepared by 'J:np!r.lal-Yum and debtor identification. Also :Involved is 
the propriety of m award of attomey' s fees to Inper:i.al-Y1.111a where a 
CCUlterclaim with lllll.tiple issues was :f.nvol ved and where no effort was 
1lllde to allocate the legal services rendered in connection with the 
counterclaim and other matters. 
DISPOSmON IN 'mE 1..GJER CX>URT 
The case was tried to the court without a jury. The District 
Qrurt awarded Plaintiff j~t against Defendants, Earl Hunter and 
LaVon Hunter, jointly and severally, in the sun of $9,135.93, together 
with attorney's fees in the sun of $4,000.00, and costs. 
At the time of trial the Third Party Defendants GLS Livestock 
ManagEm!!lt, Inc. and George L. Smith were bankrupt and, accordingly, the 
Defendants' Third Party Canplaint was not pursued. 
RELIEF SOUGH!' ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Appellants, Earl Hunter and LaVon Hunter, seek a 
reversal of the judg;nent of the trial court by eliminating all charges 
against an ''Earl H. Hunter" and eliminating the award for attomey' s 
fees. 
IDENTIFICATION OF TIIE PARTIES AND EXPlANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Earl Hunter and LaVon Hunter, his wife, Defendants and Ap-
pellants, are herein referred to as the ''Defendants," or where appro-
priate, by their names. Imperial-Yuma Production Credit Association, 
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the Plaintiff and Respcmdmt, is herein referred to as the Pldl llr'if 
where appxopdate, as 1'IDperial-YUJa". 
1~ 1 refers to a page referau:e in the naml of the c... 
1
"r1 refers to a page reference in the tJ:a1sC:dpt of tbe ~. 
STA.'lDIENl' OF FACI'S 
The Court 1 s attentim is invited to the Statammt of Pacta 8111: 
forth in the Appellant 1 s initial brief au:l to factual statamts u they 
appear in the course of argunent. 
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POINI' 1 
IN PAYIW OO'lH' S DRAFTS DRAWN <E ''EARL 
H. HUNl'ER'', AND CHARGm:; 1HOSE DRAFTS 
ro DEf'ENilo\Nr FARL HlNI'ER, P1AINTlFF EX-
CEEDED DEFENDANT FARL HlNl'ER Is FG1ER OF 
ATIURNEY, AND 'niEREFORE PLAINITFF HAD 
'mE BURDm OF OFF'ERIR; EVIDENCE 'mAT 
DErniDANT FARL HlNl'ER RECEIVED mE BEN-
EFIT OF nDSE ''EARL H. HUNl'ER" DRAFI'S; 
m SUCH EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED. 
The testim:ny of Plaintiff's own branch mmager and secretary/ 
treasurer, Roy S. Richter, set forth at length on pages 5 through 10 of 
Plaintiff's brief, does not evidence that the accomts of ''Earl H. 
Hunter" and Defendant Earl Hunter are the sam:!, as Plaintiff contends. 
The testim:ny does establish, however, that without any authorization 
whatsoever, the Plaintiff treated those accomts as the Sam:! and applied 
''Earl H. Hunter" charges to the accomt of Defendant Earl Hunter and 
LaVon Hunter. Mr. Richter never did testify that Earl Hunter and ''Earl 
H. Hunter" were the sam:! persons. He ~rerely testified that Plaintiff 
applied the charges found in Exhibit 16 to the account of Defendants 
Earl Hunter and LaVon Hunter. Exhibit 16, however, contains not only 
drafts for Defendant Earl Hunter, but for ''Earl H. Hunter" as well. Mr. 
Richter offered no explanation as to why Plaintiffs charged ''Earl H. 
Hunter" drafts to the account of Defendant Earl Hunter. 
In paying Smith's "Earl H. Hunter" dn.fts and charging them to 
Defendant Earl Hunter, Plaintiff ignored the express language of the 
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power of attomey given by Defendant Earl Hl.nter to George L. aat.th for 
Smith to make draws c:n Earl l:hnter's acc:::o\Dt with the Plaindff: 
This will be your authority to pay drafts draliD QQ 
Earl Hlnter and s:i.gr:led by George L. 9ui.th 1ilose 
specinEn sigpature appears below £See Exhibit a. 
Appendix A, page 1, of Defendants' initial brief). 
The plain language of that power of attomey upcxll\hl.ch Plaintiff al-
legedly relied, gave authority to Smith to present drafts to Plaintiff 
for payment on the ace01.nt of Defendant Earl l:hnter; there is no autlm'-
ity in that power of attomey. bJwever, or aery other doc:uaent, autbJr-
izing the Plaintiff to pay drafts draw c:n ''Earl H. l:hnter" and to cha%ge 
those drafts to Earl Hmter. 
Having exceeded Defendant Farl Hlnter' s power of attomey in 
paying Smith's mauthorized ''Earl H. Hlnter" drafts and charging them to 
the account of Defendant Farl Fhnter, Plaintiffs had the burden not only 
of establishing that Earl lhnter and ''Earl H. lhnter" are the saae 
individuals, but of showing also that Defendant Earl lhnter received the 
benefit of those drafts. Plaintiff offered no evidence, however, that 
Smith applied any proceeds of those ''Earl H. Hl.nter" drafts to Defendant 
Earl Hunter's interest or benefit in the cattle investment pool. Sig-
nificantly, Plaintiff did not even attempt to argue in its brief that 
any such evidence was presented at trial. To the contrary, Plaintiff 
admitted at trial that it had no idea where the funds from the ''Earl H. 
Hunter" draws went (T-18); nor do the Defendants, since all the facts 
pertaining to the "Earl H. Hm.ter" drafts were in the exclusive posses-
sion of the Plaintiff. 
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It does not follCM and is illogical to argue, as Plaintiff 
alternatively does on pages 10 and 11 of its brief, that because Plain-
tiff stipulated and testified at trial that the Defendant in the instant 
case, Earl linter, is entitled to ''Earl H. Hunter" credits (T-66 and T-
67; see pages 12 and 13 of Defendants' initial brief), Defendant is 
therefore bomd to accept "Earl H. linter" charges. Since Plaintiff Yl8l 
in exclusive possessicn of the facts regarding the "Earl H. Hunter" and 
Earl linter accmnts, it may well be that Defendants are entitled to 
Dm"e credits than stipulated and testified to by Plaintiff. It is 
findalllmtal, however, that Plaintiff still has the burden of proving 
that the disputed charges are for Defendants' account. 
Plaintiff also i!Iplies on page 11 of its brief, but stops 
short of expressly asserting, that because cnly one ''Hunter" naiiEs 
appears en the Hanalei distribution slips (Exhibit 18) , and because all 
credits and charges to Defendants' account bear the reference ''Hanalei", 
there was cnly one Hunter investor in the Hanalei group. Plaintiff 
stops short of making that assertion for good reason: Plaintiff well 
knows that there was no evidence whatsoever before the trial court that 
the Defendant Earl Hunter was the only ''Hunter" in the United States or 
elsewhere who was an investor in the Hanalei group. As a matter of 
fact, the Plaintiff presented no evidence whatsoever of who made up the 
Hanalei pool. Exhibit 18 does not even purport to be an exhaustive 
listing of all individuals throughout the United States and elsewhere 
involved as investors in the ''Hanalei" cattle feeding group. 
In addition, Smith was involved in ImilY cattle feeding pools 
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and many deals all across the cnntry (T-51). At. the t1a of lbd:ar'a 
dealings, liJperial-Ylllll had about thirty-four (34) loa1a of the t,.. 
involving Earl HL.nter -- b:ansact1ons with Slli.th (T-41, 42, 47). r.-
perial-Yuoa did not have any way of knawing hr:u IIRIY l.om8 it 11DU.l.d haw 
had at any tiJie involving !bi.th; they did not keep t:rack of the IUiber 
(T-43). Inperial-Ylllll was financing cnl.y a porticn of Slli.dl.'s c:Etle 
feeding pools (T-51). liJperial-YuDa was probably in fiw or six other 
pools right in that area (T-51, 52). '1he IlUiber of people in the wr-
ious pools would differ (T-52) and liOUl.d involve people tlm:Jugbout the 
United States (T-52) and, in addition, there are a IlUiber of other pools 
that Smith might have had that were being financed with other cx:Jqlf!llies 
or where other investors were involved (T-52). Accord:ingly, no coo-
elusions can be drawn at all fran Exhibit 18 as to lilether there were 
other investors in the United States or elsewhere with names similar to 
the Defendant Earl J:h.nter (e.g., ''Earl H. Hmter"), who were investors 
in the "Hanalei" feeding pool. 
Finally, Plaintiff cites four cases on ~s 11 and 12 of its 
brief which Plaintiff apparently contends stand for the proposition that 
the burden was on Defendant Earl J:h.nter to prove that Defendant Earl 
Hunter and ''Earl H. Hunter" are not the sane individual. None of those 
cases, however, dealt with exceeding the authority of a power of at-
torney nor were the respective facts regarding identity exclusively in 
the possession of the prevailing party, as in the instant case. In 
addition, in each of these cases, unlike the facts in the instant case, 
either substantial evidence was presented or there was no dispute as to 
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who the person was whose name was in questicn. See, Nelson v. Dis-
trict Court, 320 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1957) (court listed at length sub-
stantial evidence offered by Plaintiff showing Defendant, Elizabeth G. 
Nelsen, was saue ''Elizabeth L. Nelsen" involved in aut:cm:>bile accident; 
the court stressed Defendant's failure to present any rebuttal test:imty 
or evidence when Defendant knew whether she was involved in the acci-
dent); Clark v. National Adjusters, Inc., 348 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1959) 
(holding it inccnsequential that a su:mr:ns named "Odessa Clark" instead 
of Odessa W. Clark, because it was mdisputed that the individual 
served, by whatever name, owed the debt, tlrus m:lk:ing the defense in that 
case cne of a mere teclm:ical error in the SUIIIIDrlS rather than a question 
of identity); Tate v. State, 122 S.E. 2d 528 (Ga. App. 1961) (holding 
inconsequential errcneous allegations in an indictment naming ''Carmie 
Lyrm Day" rather than Connie Arme Day, the minor child actually aban-
doned, where there was "no question but the identity of the child was 
proved as being the infant referred to in the indictment"); Bowlin v. 
Freeland, 289 S.W. 721 (Tex. Ct. App. 1926) (analysis of separately 
recorded chains of title disclosed apparent corrm:m grantor evidencing 
coomm identity of "J. K. Freeland" and "J. R. Freeland" as grantor; no 
other factual circumstances cited to suggest otherwise). 
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FOINI' II 
'DIE FAcr mAT SMI'lH WAS 'DIE lEFENDI\Nl'' S 
AGmr om mr Al1l'HlRIZE 'DIE 1'IAml'DF 
TO CHARGE TO DEFEMlANl'S' AaXUn' ImAFIS 
DRAm BY SMI'lH m AtOl1IER PF.BSI{' s J£-
comr WITID1l' DEFENDANrS' ~
··~ 
Plaintiff illogically argues in Point II (page 13 and 14) of 
its brief that because Plaintiff paid !mi.th' s UUIUthorlzecl "Earl H. 
Htnter" drafts and thereby exceeded Defendant Earl linter's power of 
attorney, the Defendants are bol.nd by Pla:intiff's actials. 'lb1s argu-
ment is contrary to ftndamental agency law. !mi.th' s agatey liiBS express 
and limited. When Plaintiff allowed !mi.th to exceed his agatey, the 
Plaintiff dealt with him at its (the Plaintiff's) peril -- mt at the 
Defendants' peril. 
Plaintiff's argtm![lt ignores the express and limiting language 
of Defendant's power of attorney that Plaintiff claims to have relied at 
in paying Smith's ''Earl H. Hwter" drafts: 
This will be your authority to pay drafts drawn 
on Earl Hwter and sil!}:led by George L. Smith, 
whose specimen sil!}:lature appears below [See 
Point II, p. 18 of Appellants' initial brief for 
discussion regarding this power of attorney] . 
It is incredible to argue that the Plaintiff, having paid 
"Earl H. Hwter" drafts not authorized by Defendant Earl Hwter, is 
entitle to charge those drafts against Defendant Earl Hwter because 
George L. Smith was Earl Hwter's agent. Smith was Defendant Earl 
HUlter' s agent with only such authority as is set forth in the power of 
attorney. That document gave no authority to Plaintiff to pay any 
drafts submitted by Smith for ''Earl H. Hunter." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-10-
rn Po;int 11 (page 18-21) of their initial brief' Defendants 
cite casea that Plaintiff takes no exception to which clearly support th 
fuldaaental propositim that Plaintiff could not know:ingly or negligently 
allow George L. Smi.th to exceed the express written authority given him 
by Defendant Earl Hmter and then take the position that Defendant Earl 
Hmter is bol.lld by the actions of Smi.th and the Plaintiff. Plaintiff, 
en the other hand, cites no cases supporting its position; nor do De-
fendants believe it could. 
At the very least, because Plaintiff allowed George L. Smith~ 
draw drafts, contrary to the written power of attomey, on the account of 
''Earl H. Hlnter" rather than Defendant Earl Hmter, it was incuni:Jent uprn 
Plaintiff to establish that the monies so drawn by George L. Smith for 
''Earl H. Hunter" were then applied to the benefit of Defendant Earl 
Hunter in the cattle invest:JIEnt pool in which he was an investor. 
Plaintiff offered no such evidence. 
POmr III 
THE AYlARD OF ATI'ORNEY' S FEES TO THE 
PlAINI'IFF WAS 00'1' BASED ON !illY SUP-
PORTING EVIDENCE, NO EVIDENCE "WHAT-
SOEVER HAVING BEEN PRESENTED AS TO 
THE EFFDRTS OF PlAINTIFF' S COUNSEL 
IN PROSECUITNG THE PROMISSORY NOI'E 
AS OPPOSED TO DEFENDTIX; AGAINST DE-
FENJ}I,NTS' COUNTERClAIM AND RESISTING 
THE CLASS ACTION "MJTION 
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Jn Point III begiming en page 14 of ita brief, ftalnttff 
recites the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 13 to the effaet tt.t tba 
award of $4, 000.00 attomey' s fees to Plaintiff 1a a ~ llt:tXE-
ney' s fee awarded to Plaintiff "exclusive of the Defendants' CIU\tar-
cla:lln". Plaintiff then adui.ts, however, en page 15 of ita brief, t:t.t 
counsel for Plaintiff 
did not make a specific allocatim of time spmt 
beONee!l plaintiff's action en the promissory note 
and the defense of Defendant's comtercla:im. 
By admi.ssicn, then, the trial court had no evidence before it 
upon which to base the award of $4,000.00 attomey's fees for just the 
prosecution of the note. All the trial court had was the test:im:my of 
counsel for the plaintiff that his total fees in the ent:he case had a 
reasonable value of $7,164.00. The court had no evidence of my kind 
indicating how IIJJCh of that total effort was spent :In prosecuting the 
promissory note as opposed to defending against Defendants' comter-
claims. How could the trial court, then, have possibly call! up with the 
$4,000.00 figure other than to have arbitrarily imposed that figure an 
the Defendants? 
The arbitrary nature of the trial court's assesSIJI:'!Ilt of at-
torney's fees at $4,000.00 is striking when it is considered that the 
total principal amount of the account sought to be collected by the 
plaintiff '\VaS only $5,439.41. For that small account, the trial court 
a=ded $4,000.00 in attorney's fees and called it "reasonable". Un-
doubtedly, if counsel for the plaintiff would have allocated for the 
court his efforts between prosecution of the promissory note and defense 
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against the Defendants' comtercl.aim9, the trial court 1NOUl.d have been 
apprised of the fact that a m.x:h mre substantial portion of the $7,164.00 
fee was :IJicurred in defending the comterclaims, and not in prosecuting 
the note. Allocaticn, luever, by comsel' s own amussion, was never 
uade; in that 1:egard, the Court's attention is further invited to COUl-
sel's testimony elicited on cross-examtnation \.r-106-112). 
Clearly, $4,000.00 in attorney's fees could not possibly have 
been reasCXIBbly incurred in prosecuting this prauissory note for a 
$5,439.41 principal am:n.nt. Not even Plaintiff has contended, either in 
its brief or bef01:e the trial court, that it incurred $4,000.00 legal 
expenses in just prosecuting the note. Of the $4,000.00 awarded by the 
trial court to the Plaintiff as attorney's fees for prosecuticn of the 
note, supposedly ''exclusive of the defense of Defendants' counterclaim!", 
a large portion nust actually have been incurred in defending against the 
fraud and security violation counterclaims and in neeting the Defendants' 
class action tiDtion. 
The instant case is a prine exarrple of why attorney's fees 
carmot be assessed without test:imJny allocating the atton1ey' s efforts 
between prosecuting a promissory note, which contractually provides for 
attorney's fees, and defending against counterclaims, for which attor-
ney's fees are not recov>erable, as the court held in Nelson v. Newnm, 
583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978). 
Plaintiff attempts to distinquish Nelson by arguing that since 
the trial court in the instant case rrade a specific finding of fact as t, 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff, "exclusive of the 
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defense of Defendants' COtDteD!lama", ~ cbea 1lat ~FPtP. Yet, u 
in Nelson, the trial court :In tbe :lnstmt ease aay mJt: ...-c .-:taawy'a 
fees for the defense against tbe comtercl.ahB, nor aay tz abit:alrUJ' 
determine reasmable attomey' s fee& for 'Pft.'""utica of die ftJte 1lhm 
there is no allocation whatsoever as to da a efbt ~ :In p:oa-
ecuting the note. It is particularly si.gpi.fiamt tbat :In...._ die 
Court stated: 
Cot.nsel testified that he had expended these houn 
on the entire case, and 'had no idea' what portion 
of that t:i.m! was attributable to the collection of 
the notes. 
Defendant is entitled to reasmable attorney's 
fees for the note, as noted ante, but he failed 
in his burden of mf with rec to the EIJIDt 
of tine necessari ~ Bt for t purpose. 
[enpbaSis added; s~~d at 604). 
Similarly, the Plaintiff in the instant case failed :fn its proof as 
noted by Plaintiff itself on Page 15 of its brief: "[Colnsel for 
Plaintiff] did not make a specific allocation of time be~ Plain-
tiff's action on the proorl.ssory note and the defense of Defendants' 
counterclaims." Nelson clearly is en point with the instant case since, 
as in Nelson, Plaintiff here has failed in its burden of proof regarding 
the annunt of time necessarily spent in prosecuting the note as opposed 
to defending against the counterclaims. 
The Plaintiff's assertions on pages 16 and 17 of its brief that 
Stubbs v. Herrm:!rt, 567 P. 2d 168 (Utah 1977) (cited by the Court in 
Nelson) , is consistent with the trial court's award of attorneys fees in 
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the instant case, clearly is not correct. In Stubbs, the court affitm!d 
the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party for 
prosecution of a promissory note and the foreclosure of a nmtgage which 
secured the note, while disallowing attorney's fees for the negotiatioo 
and defense against a comterclaim. Regarding the award of attorney's 
fees for successful prosecution of the note and foreclosure of the 
nmtgage, the Court stated: 
Here, contractual liability is involved and the 
court properly awarded plaintiff his fees for 
the foreclosure. Plaintiff's att~ testi-
fied that he had expended 3-3/Bth s on t:he 
collection and foreclosure action [567 P.Zd at 
171; enphasis added] . 
As this Court observed in Stubbs, the trial court properly 
awarded reasonable attorney's fees for prosecution of the promissory 
note based upon testimony by Plaintiff's attorney as to the amount of 
time he had expended on the collection and foreclosure action as well ~ 
on his test:imJny regarding the usual fees charged by attorneys in the 
camn.nity. By Plaintiff's own admission, however, there was no alloca-
tion at all in the instant case as to the ti.rre necessarily spent by 
counsel for Plaintiff in prosecuting the prorrri_ssory note versus defend-
ing against the counterclaims of the Defendants. Contrary to Plain-
tiff's arguiiE11t, Stubbs stands for the proposition that the trial court, 
in awarding attorney's fees, must base that decision upon evidence 
allocating the efforts of Plaintiff's attorney between attempting to 
collect on a promissory note and defending against counterclaims. 
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POINr IV 
IT IDULD BE IMPROPER '10 mMAND nns 
CASE FOR FUimiER EVIIlEOCE Rm\RDOO 
'mE IDENlTI'Y OF EARL H. HlNl'ER OR n1E 
ALI.OCATICE OF TIME IN AW!\RDIR; Al"'IR-
NEY'S FEES. 
Plaintiff-Respcndent argues in Point IV en page 17 of its 
brief that pursuant to Rule 76(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this 
Court may remand the case to the trial court for further pmc:eed:l.ngs en 
the identity of Earl Hunter and "Farl H. HLnter" and the allocatim of 
attorney's fees. Obviously, the identity of Earl H. HLnter and the 
allocation of attorney's fees could only be further detem:l.ned by the 
taking of new evidence en behalf of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff has had 
its day in court and the opporttnity to atteupt to prove that Earl 
Hunter and "Farl H. Hunter" are the sane persons and to present tes-
tinony regarding the allocation of attorney's fees for prosecuticn of 
the pranissory note. It ~d not be proper for Plaintiff to have boo 
bites of the apple and ~ days in court where it had a crnplete op-
portunity, prior to resting its case in the trial court, to present 
whatsoever relevant evidence it desired. Defendants have already been 
put to considerable unrecoverable expense because of Plaintiff's failure 
to even offer evidence on these unresolved critical issues. 
In addition, it is irrportant to note as indicated in Point I, 
page 14, of Defendant's initial brief, that at the conclusion of the 
trial, after both parties had rested and following closing arguments, 
Plaintiff IIDved the trial court to reopen the case to allow Plaintiff to 
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try to establish that Defendant Earl Hunter is "Earl H. Hunter". The 
trial court appropriately denied that mtion and Plamtiff has not 
appealed fran the ruling. 
Rule 74(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires a party 
who desires to cross appeal fran an order to file a statenEnt of the 
points en which he intends to rely on such cross appeal within the tine 
required by Rule 75(d). Rule 75(d) requires the statenEnt of points to 
be filed with:in 10 days after the service and filing of the appellant's 
desigpation of the record on appeal. No such statenm.t of points was 
filed by Respondent pursuant to Rules 74(b) and 75(d) and thus Plaintiff 
has not appealed fran the Court's order denying Plcrintiff' s mtion to 
reopen the trial for the purpose of presenting additional evidence. In 
not cross appealing from the Court's aforesaid order denying Plaintiff's 
notion to reopen the case, Plcrlntiff has already elected to forego any 
further opportulity to attenpt to present evidence to the trial court 
which it did not present during trial. 
In addition, Defendants certainly were not under any obli-
gation, as Plaintiff i.rrpliedly contends in Point rv of its brief, to 
assist in proving Plaintiff's case by pointing out to the trial court or 
opposing counsel prior to closing arguments that Plaintiff had not 
submitted any evidence that Earl Htmter and "Earl H. Htmter" are the 
same persons, that monies issued by Plaintiffs to George L. Smith pur-
suant to the ''Earl H. Htmter" drafts were applied by Srrri.th to the cattle 
pool account of Defendant Earl Htmter, or that Plaintiff had not allo-
cated its attorney's fees between prosecution of the note and defense of 
the counterclaim. Plaintiff clearly had that burden. 
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rn paying ::mi.th 1 s drafts driM'l. cn "Earl H. llDter," a ct.a-
ing those drafts to Deferu:lant Earl llnter, Plaintiff ~ ])afen ..... 
Earl llnter1 s power of attomey, and therefore Pla:lnt1ff hid the 1udlls 
of offering evidence that Defendant Earl linter received tbe ba1efit of 
those ''Earl H. llnter" drafts; no such evidence ws preamted. 
The fact that ::mf.th wa5 the Ileferu:lant IS asent did not aJI:h-
Orize the Plaintiff to charge to Defendants' accomt drafts dalm by 
Smith on another perscn' s accomt without Defendants 1 authorizatial. 
1he award of attomey' s fees to the Plaintiff ws not based cn 
any supporting evidence, no evidence whatsoever having been presmted as 
to the efforts of Plaintiff's comsel in prosecuting the p!Did..ssory note 
as opposed to defending against Defendants' comterclaim and resisting 
the class action notion. 
It 'INOuld be inproper to remand this case for further evidence 
regarding the identity of Earl H. lhnter or the allocation of time in 
awarding attorney's fees. 
The judgnent of the trial court should be reversed. The 
Plaintiff has failed in its proof, both with respect to the accomting 
and attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McMURRAY & ANDERSON 
By~/fP'/£ ~.~yand ~ 
Robert J. Dale 
Attorneys for Earl and LaVen Hunter 
Defendants-Appellants 
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